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Nuisance Suits
William H.J. Hubbard∗
whubbard@uchicago.edu
June 24, 2014
Abstract
This paper develops a simple but general model of negative-expected-
value (NEV) suit and settlement given symmetric information. It ac-
counts for the roles of the merits, litigation costs, and bargaining power;
incorporates complaints and answers for which parties’ investments in
pleading detail are endogenously determined; permits strategic default
by the defendant; and nests several existing models of NEV litigation
as special cases. It generates testable, counterintuitive, empirical pre-
dictions and facilitates normative analysis. For example, the model
predicts that plausibility pleading standards will have modest effects in
deterring low-merit suits but may be harmful to plaintiffs and defen-
dants settling stronger cases.
1 Introduction
A persistent source of vexation for lawyers, both in practice and in the Ivory
Tower, is “frivolous” or “nuisance” litigation. In the purest sense of the term,
and the sense which I will employ herein, a nuisance suit is a suit filed because
it has positive settlement value, notwithstanding the fact that it is common
knowledge to the plaintiff and the defendant that the expected value plaintiff’s
claim is less than the plaintiff’s cost of prosecuting the suit. Frivolous liti-
gation, in common usage and in the sense that I will use the term herein,
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Law School. I am grateful for comments from Douglas Baird, Scott Baker, Omri Ben-
Shahar, Emily Buss, Saul Levmore, Randy Picker, and participants at the Law & Economics
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is a species of nuisance litigation. In a frivolous suit, the expected value of
plaintiff’s claim is less than plaintiff’s cost of litigating because the claim is
extremely low merit—the likelihood of prevailing at summary judgment (let
alone trial) is so low that the expected value of the claim is near zero. The
notion is that the prospect of expensive litigation drives the defendant to pay
a settlement despite knowing that, were the case to go to trial, the defendant
would probably or certainly win.
This is not to say that nuisance litigation, let alone “frivolous” litigation,
exists or is a significant phenomenon; indeed, practitioners and commentators
disagree about the prevalence of nuisance suits.1 There is no shortage of
anecdotes of multi-million dollar settlements of specious claims, and for years
entities such as trade associations have lobbied for legal reforms directed to
curbing nuisance suits. But empirical evidence on the phenomenon of nuisance
suits is scarce.
Further, it is not clear how one should judge nuisance litigation norma-
tively: a claim could be nuisance-value because it is frivolous, or because it
has high merit but the stakes are low relative to the plaintiff’s cost of litigating.
Because of this, theoretical work can help improve our understanding by
establishing the conditions under which nuisance settlements might arise and
by generating empirical predictions that can help academics test the prevalence
of nuisance suits. Theoretical work can also assist normative judgments about
whether and how law should address potential nuisance litigation.
The early conventional wisdom was that nuisance litigation should not oc-
cur, because nuisance suits are, by definition, negative-expected-value (NEV)
suits, in that the cost to the plaintiff of litigating to judgment exceeds the
expected judgment plaintiff would win. Thus, a plaintiff would rather drop his
case than litigate. A series of papers beginning with Rosenberg and Shavell
(1985) have developed models in which both parties are fully informed of the
weakness of the plaintiff’s claim, but the plaintiff is nonetheless able to ex-
tract a positive settlement by taking advantage of the defendant’s costs of
defending the suit. This literature on nuisance suits has generated a number
of important insights, but most models have focused on explaining particular
features of nuisance litigation. As a consequence, no unified model of nuisance
litigation has emerged, and existing models do not attempt to explain even
basic stylized facts about civil litigation.
Consider the seminal case on federal civil pleading standards, Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 [2007]). In Twombly, the Supreme
Court dismissed the complaint, requiring that the complaint meet a higher,
“plausibility” standard of pleading than the liberal, “notice pleading” stan-
dard traditionally invoked by federal courts. A primary, explicit motivation
1See, for example, Bone (1997) for a discussion the rhetoric and lack of evidence sur-
rounding the issue of frivolous litigation.
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for this ruling was concern about asymmetrical costs of litigation favoring the
plaintiff that would lead to a nuisance settlement of a weak claim. Yet the
Twombly complaint was lengthy and contained significant factual detail, going
far beyond providing mere notice to the defendants. This raises two puzzles:
Why would the Twombly plaintiffs plead in detail at a time when the law did
not require detailed pleading? And more to the point, if the plaintiffs were
(as the Court implied) bringing a nuisance claim, whose value derives entirely
from the asymmetrically high litigation costs of the defendant, why would the
plaintiffs expend greater than necessary costs on detailed pleading, running up
their own costs in a case that they have no illusions of winning? This paper
offers an explanation for this and other potential puzzles about the oft-alleged,
but poorly understood, phenomenon of nuisance suits and settlements.
My objective in this paper is to develop a simple, but general, model of nui-
sance litigation that incorporates existing insights but better describes actual
patterns of litigation and generates testable empirical predictions. Existing
models offer a host of important results. Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) and
Bebchuk (1996) showed that the sequencing of litigation costs affects the vi-
ability of NEV claims. Croson and Mnookin’s insight was to recognize that
the sequencing of the parties’ litigation costs can be endogenously determined
by the parties themselves, for strategic reasons. Miceli (1993), Farmer and
Pecorino (1998), and others showed that both parties can employ strategies
to commit to pursue, or to commit to refuse, nuisance settlements. Schwartz
and Wickelgren (2009) showed that even in a full-information environment,
an optimal strategy of stonewalling and delay can prevent settlement. These
models (and mine) recognize and embody the principle noted by Rosenberg
and Shavell (2006, p. 43): the strategies employed in NEV litigation are ex-
amples of “the well-appreciated general conclusion that a party may benefit by
removing future options, since this form of commitment can have advantageous
incentive effects.”
My model below captures each of these insights, generalizes and extends
them, maps them onto real-life features of civil litigation, and generates testable
empirical predictions. The model takes the form of a sequential, symmetrical-
information game, which incorporates endogenously determined costly plead-
ing and choice of pleading detail. Extensions to the model incorporate the
strategic use of default by the defendant, nuisance claims brought by multiple
plaintiffs, and different types of litigation-related costs. Rosenberg and Shavell
(1985), Bebchuk (1996), and Croson and Mnookin (1996) all nest as special
cases.2
This model explains several putative features of nuisance litigation that
previous models have either not accounted for, or been unable to explain:
2Related work on pre-filing negotiation and settlement explores the question, largely
unaddressed by this literature, of why (costly) lawsuits would ever be filed in a symmetric-
information environment. See Hubbard (2014a). The model in Hubbard (2014a) allows one
to nest Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009) as a special case as well.
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1. Costly and detailed pleading by plaintiffs, even in a nuisance-suit context;
2. Low cost, sparse pleading by defendants, even in a nuisance-suit context;
3. Nuisance settlements that exceed the cost to defendant of filing an an-
swer;
4. The widely held view that the burdens of nuisance litigation on defen-
dants arise primarily from low-merit, rather than low-stakes, claims.
These patterns emerge endogenously in a simple model of suit and settle-
ment in which the parties can determine the timing of their expenditures on
litigation.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: I review existing models
of NEV litigation in Section 2. I describe my model informally and present
a numerical example in Section 3. I present the formal model with proofs,
discussion, and extensions in Section 4.
Section 5 considers the testable empirical predictions of the model. While
not all of them can be confirmed or refuted without further study, some pre-
dictions, such as detailed pleading by some plaintiffs and minimal pleading
detail from defendants, are consistent with established stylized facts.
While the focus of this paper is primarily positive, the model I present is
broadly applicable to normative questions about nuisance litigation. In Section
6, I show how my model can generate predictions about the effects of the
plausibility pleading standard announced by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
(550 U.S. 544 [2007]) on nuisance litiation, including potentially surprising
negative effects on both plaintiffs and defendants.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature begins with Rosenberg and Shavell (1985). Their logic is straight-
forward. It is costly for a defendant to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint,
and failure to respond will lead to a default judgment against the defendant.
Thus, the defendant will be willing to settle with a plaintiff for any amount less
than the cost of responding to the plaintiff’s complaint, even if the plaintiff’s
claim is wholly meritless. Because of this, the plaintiff with a NEV claim will
sue, so long as the cost of filing the complaint is less than the amount of the
settlement the plaintiff would be able to extract.
The central insight of Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) is that a plaintiff with
a NEV claim can succeed at obtaining a nuisance settlement. One can question
the empirical relevance of this model, however. In this model, all a defendant
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has to do to avoid a default judgment is file an answer. As Bone notes, be-
cause “answering is seldom more costly than filing, the model predicts that
few frivolous plaintiffs will find it worthwhile to sue” (Bone 2003, p.150). In-
deed, Bone (1997, p. 538) points out that in a full-information environment,
the cost to the defendant of admitting or denying the allegations of the com-
plaint should be trivial. Nor does observed practice jibe with the model. A
stylized fact about litigation practice is that complaints are sometimes (not
always) highly detailed accounts of the facts related to the plaintiff’s claim,
but answers are almost invariably boilerplate documents denying the plaintiff’s
central allegations or asserting a lack of information upon which an admission
or denial can be made. Consequently, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which
the Rosenberg and Shavell model maps on to observed patterns of litigation.
Bebchuk (1996) provides a more general approach to the same question.
Bebchuk considers the possibility that litigation is divided into stages and the
costs of litigation are divided among these stages. In each stage, one (perhaps
randomly chosen) party has the opportunity to propose a settlement, which
the other party can accept or reject. In this model, even if a lawsuit taken
as a whole is NEV, if the costs are split among the stages of litigation, it is
possible that, relative to the costs of litigating the very last stage, the plaintiff’s
claim is PEV. Thus, the plaintiff has a credible threat to go to trial at the last
stage of litigation, and the defendant will be willing to settle the case then.
If the plaintiff has sufficient bargaining power, this settlement will be large
enough that in the second-to-last stage of litigation, the plaintiff will also have
a credible threat to move forward, thereby making the defendant willing to
settle in that stage as well. By backwards induction, one sees that the plaintiff
has a credible threat to sue in the first period, and the parties will settle
immediately.
This result retains the central insight that NEV claims can generates posi-
tive settlements, and it overcomes the concern that the Rosenberg and Shavell
model implies that the cost of a boilerplate answer places a ceiling on the
settlement value of a NEV claim. Yet it does not explain truly “frivolous”
litigation—claims which have no merit at all. For the backwards induction to
generate a positive settlement, the expected judgment at trial must be large
enough to outweigh the plaintiff’s costs in the final period of litigation, and
this is impossible for a suit with zero merit.
Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009) argue that NEV claims can never gener-
ate nuisance settlements for plaintiffs. In their model, an indefinite number of
offers and counter-offers can be made costlessly during litigation. Because of
this, they argue, the plaintiff will not be able to extract a settlement during
litigation large enough to make the initial threat to sue credible. This result
challenges the claim that nuisance litigation exists at all, let alone is a serious
problem. Yet this model has difficulty gaining traction as a model of litigation
rather than a model of negotiation; it models costly litigation activity as the
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plaintiff’s outside option, but this is only true before a suit is filed. Thus,
I address this model in other work that considers pre-suit settlement; Hub-
bard (2014a) builds on these insights from Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009) in
modeling both pre-filing and post-filing settlement.3
A recurring argument in the literature is that nuisance settlements are
not possible because defendants can simply commit to a policy of refusing to
settle and, by developing a repuation for doing so, will deter nuisance claims
(Bone 1997, p. 540; Miceli 1993). This insight, though, fails to resolve either
theoretical or empirical assertions about nuisance claims—the problem is that
the same argument can be made to prove that nuisance litigation is possible,
because plaintiffs can simply commit to a policy of refusing to be deterred
(Farmer and Pecorino 1998; see also Chen 2006). These models thus leave
unresolved the question of whether nuisance claims can be viable.
Closely related to this last point, and closest in spirit to the model I de-
velop, is the model of Croson and Mnookin (1996). While papers since Rosen-
berg and Shavell (1985) have recognized that sunk costs can generate positive
settlements for NEV claims (see Rasmusen [1998]), Croson and Mnookin were
the first to present a model in which the amount of costs sunk were endoge-
nously determined. They argue that a plaintiff can create a credible threat to
sue by hiring an attorney on retainer, such that part of the plaintiff’s cost of
litigating is sunk. If the plaintiff’s remaining litigation costs are less than the
expected judgment from litigation, the plaintiff will have a credible threat to
sue and can induce a settlement. They note, however, that a defendant could
employ a symmetrical cost-sinking strategy. Thus, like reputation-based mod-
els, Croson and Mnookin’s model leaves unresolved the question of whether
the plaintiff or the defendant will win the race to sink costs and deter the other
from executing his preferred strategy. As I show below, the winner of the race
to sink costs is not indeterminate (nor a draw). Rather, parties’ relative litiga-
tion costs determine the outcome of this contest, and I derive analytically the
conditions under which the plaintiff or the defendant successfully sinks costs
to the exclusion of the other.
Looking at these models, one might ask: To what extent can the parties
control the timing and order of litigation costs? Do features of civil procedure
permit the strategies identified in these (highly abstracted) models? Does the
3In this regard, it is worth noting that an implication of each of the models discussed
in this section is to predict, at most, some nuisance settlements but no nuisance suits. In
a symmetrical-information environment, why would the parties wait for a filed complaint
before settling, when they could settle the claim pre-complaint and save the cost of filing?
Yet, claims of “abusive” or “frivolous” litigation by practitioners revolve around accounts of
filed lawsuits that are frivolous. Existing models of NEV litigation, however, rule out pre-
suit settlement a priori. Consistent with this approach, my model assumes that settlement,
if it occurs, occurs in litigation. The basic, if unstated, assumption here is that some form of
pre-suit bargaining failure leads to litigation, even in a symmetric-information context. In
related work, I show that a simple, general model of bargaining under symmetric-information
can lead to precisely such bargaining failures. Hubbard (2014a).
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sequencing of civil litigation make it easier for one party or another to sink
costs to precipitate or deter settlement? I address these questions in the model
below.
3 Informal Treatment
3.1 Overview of the Model
My model represents litigation as a sequential, symmetric-information game
in the spirit of Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) and Bebchuk (1996). The goal
of this model is to represent the basic dynamics of pleading and settlement
in a way that is both reasonably realistic and analytically tractable. This
model is set up as follows: A potential plaintiff has a claim against a potential
defendant.4 The amount at stake and plaintiff’s likelihood of winning in court
are known to both parties, as are the parties’ costs of litigation. While this
model applies to all claims, whether PEV or NEV, the interesting cases for our
purposes involve NEV claims. Except where otherwise noted, the discussion
below will assume a NEV claim.
The total cost of litigating a case to judgment is assumed to be fixed, but
the plaintiff’s cost of filing a complaint is not. The cost of filing a complaint
includes both the (presumably nominal) filing fee charged by the court and
the cost of preparing the complaint. The plaintiff can choose how much to
spend on the complaint; a long, detailed complaint that reflects thorough
preparation for litigation will cost more than a bare-bones complaint that
describes the plaintiff’s claim in a cursory manner. Importantly, much of the
work that a plaintiff would have to do later in the litigation can be done before
filing—collecting and organizing evidence, conducting legal research, drafting
memoranda, organizing a litigation team, and so on. These pre-litigation costs
thus reduce the cost that would have to be spent during litigation.
Note that I do not require the possibility of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Instead, the model at this point assumes that a filed complaint
will never be dismissed.5 (I turn to the effect of pleading standards in Section
6.)
4For brevity, I omit “potential” in describing plaintiffs and defendants herein, even when
describing pre-litigation behavior.
5My focus is on the extent to which low-merit cases are (or are not) screened out by the
deliberate, strategic behavior of potential litigants, even in the absence of any gatekeeping
function of the courts at the pleading stage. One could also treat this absence of any
risk of dismissal as a rough approximation of the idealized conception of “notice pleading.”
Implicit in this setup is also the assumption that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
11 (or a state-court counterpart), which sanctions pleadings which contain frivolous claims
or “needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” does not foreclose filings in all of the scenarios
considered herein.
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The defendant may also have the ability to sink its litigation costs in ad-
vance of litigation. This model allows for the defendant to sink its litigation
costs by paying a non-refundable retainer to its lawyers in advance of the
plaintiff’s opportunity to demand a settlement or draft a complaint.6
In the simplest version of this model, plaintiff first decides whether to file
suit or abandon the claim. If he files suit, he chooses how much to invest in
preparing the complaint. Next, the defendant must prepare its answer. The
parties then have opportunity to settle.7 If the parties do not settle, they pay
their litigation costs, and the court enters judgment. (Recall that because this
is a full-information model, the expected judgment is common knowledge.)
What is the solution to this model? I present a rough outline here, omit-
ting nuances and qualifications that will be made explicit during the formal
treatment of the model.
The first question to consider is whether the plaintiff has a credible threat
to sue, given that his claim is NEV. If he has no credible threat to sue, the
defendant will never agree to a positive settlement amount, and the plaintiff
will abandon the claim. Here is where pleading comes in. By investing heavily
in pre-complaint investigation, the plaintiff is able to sink the costs of discovery
that he otherwise would have to bear after filing. Conditional on having sunk
these costs, the plaintiff’s expected judgment is large enough relative to the
remaining costs of litigation that he now has a credible threat to sue. By
voluntarily undertaking highly detailed pleadings, the plaintiff makes these
sunk costs observable to the defendant, thereby making credible the threat to
continue litigating through to judgment.8
Given a credible threat to go to trial from the plaintiff, the defendant will
settle. Thus, a plaintiff who sinks litigation costs and then files a detailed com-
plaint may be able to obtain positive settlement from the defendant, despite
having a NEV claim.
If a plaintiff can, under some conditions, use detailed pleading to sink
6Implicit in this sequencing of events are the notions that the nuisance claim arises after
the defendant has an opportunity to pay a retainer, and the plaintiff cannot act until the
nuisance claim arises. This sequence seems to fit the typical narrative of nuisance litigation:
the defendant is a large corporation frequently subject to lawsuits, and which therefore
expects to face nuisance claims even if it currently faces none. As such, it can prepare for
litigation in advance of a discrete claim. The plaintiff is an individual and cannot act until
he has suffered some (real or perceived) legal injury. Importantly, though, the results of the
model are not sensitive to these assumptions. As I discuss in Section 4.4, a model in which
plaintiff can pay a retainer in advance of a specific claim arising is simply a special case of
the model presented here.
7As will become obvious below, the results are no different if the parties have an oppor-
tunity to settle before the defendant prepares an answer.
8For brevity, I will occasionally refer to “going to trial” rather than “taking the claim
to judgment.” Though the literature tends to refer to “trial,” I prefer “judgment,” given
that few claims go to trial, and in the nuisance suit context, the real endgame is summary
judgment anyway. Nonetheless, “trial” is a convenient shorthand.
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litigation costs and generate nuisance settlement value in a NEV claim, then
the question arises whether the defendant can preempt this strategy through
sinking costs of its own. The idea is that by sinking part of its litigation costs,
the defendant reduces the expected settlement that the plaintiff will be able to
obtain (because saved litigation costs create the surplus from settlement that
the parties share). So long as the loss from paying these litigation costs up
front is preferable to the cost of paying a nuisance settlement, the defendant
benefits from this sunk-cost strategy. This strategy can deter some, but not all,
NEV claims. It does not always work because the parties split the surplus (the
saved litigation costs) in settlement. Thus, a defendant only pays a fraction
of its litigation costs in settlement. If this fraction is lower than the share
of costs the defendant must sink in order to deter the plaintiff, a sunk-costs
strategy simply is not worthwhile to the defendant.
3.2 Numerical Example
Imagine a single plaintiff and a single defendant. The plaintiff has a frivolous
claim (he demands $1000 but has zero chance of winning, so the claim is worth
$0), and it would cost plaintiff $100 to litigate the claim to judgment. It would
cost the defendant $500 to defend the claim.
For the moment, set aside the possibility of the defendant paying a retainer
to deter settlement or the possibility of defendant filing a detailed answer. I
will show in a moment that neither of these possibilities will occur. But to be
concrete, let us begin with what the plaintiff can do to obtain a settlement.
The plaintiff creates a credible threat to sue by front-loading litigation costs.
The plaintiff has a NEV claim—he expects to win $0 in court, but would pay
$100 in litigation costs. Given this, the plaintiff will spend $100 preparing
for litigation and drafting a detailed complaint. This eliminates the cost of
litigating to judgment for the plaintiff.9 With nothing left to lose, plaintiff
credibly threatens to litigate to judgment.
This credible threat will generate a positive settlement. Given that the
plaintiff is willing to take the case to judgment, the defendant stands to lose
$500 in litigation costs if it does not settle. For this reason, the defendant
is willing to pay up to $500 to settle the case. (And because settlement is
less costly than default, the defendant will of course choose to answer rather
than default.) If the case goes to judgment, the plaintiff pays no additional
litigation costs but wins no judgment, so the plaintiff is willing to accept as
little as $0 to settle the case. With equal bargaining power of the parties,
they will split the difference and settle for $250. Since the plaintiff spent $100
9Note that the sorts of costs that can’t be front-loaded—trial preparation, reviewing
defendant’s production in discovery, responding to a summary judgment motion—are not
litigation costs to a plaintiff with a frivolous suit, because the plaintiff will abandon the case
once the litigation reaches the summary judgment stage.
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preparing the complaint, the plaintiff’s net payoff is $150.
Now let us consider whether the defendant can do better by sinking litiga-
tion costs when preparing an answer. The answer is no. The defendant, unlike
the plaintiff, will not use detailed pleading. As noted above, without a detailed
answer the plaintiff settles for $250. The defendant can prevent settlement by
reducing the plaintiff’s payoff to zero—but defendant can only do this by sink-
ing all $500 of its litigation costs. Anything less, and the plaintiff can still
extract a positive settlement upon the threat of going to judgment and forcing
the defendant to spend its remaining litigation costs. The defendant is better
off paying a fraction of its litigation costs in settlement than paying all of them
to prevent settlement.
Next, consider the possibility that the defendant can preempt the nuisance
claim by paying a retainer before the plaintiff even appears on the scene. In
this example, the defendant will not deter the plaintiff by sinking its costs. In
order for the defendant to deter suit, the retainer must be sufficient to reduce
to zero the expected payoff from filing suit and then settling. To do this, the
defendant must pay a retainer of $300. With $300 of the defendant’s $500 in
litigation costs already sunk, the plaintiff can demand no more than $200 in
settlement after filing suit. (The defendant will still demand $0.) This reduces
the expected value of settlement to $100, which merely offsets the cost of filing
the complaint and leaves the plaintiff with an expected net payoff of $0. A
retainer of $300, though, is more than the cost of settlement! In this example,
sinking costs allows the plaintiff to make a credible threat to bring a NEV
claim, but does not allow the defendant to deter the threat.
Note, however, that if the asymmetry in litigation costs were not as great,
the defendant could deter nuisance settlements by paying a retainer. If, for
example, defendant’s litigation costs were only $300, the expected settlement
in litigation would be $150. By paying a retainer of only $100, the defendant
could reduce the expected settlement to $100 (equal to the plaintiff’s cost of
filing a credible suit) and deter the threat of a nuisance settlement.
4 Formal Treatment
4.1 Basic Model
There is a dispute between plaintiff P and defendant D. The potential mon-
etary judgment at stake is J , and both plaintiff and defendant believe that
plaintiff has probability of winning at trial equal to pi. The expected judgment
at trial is thus piJ . Party i has cost of litigation Ci. The cost of litigation is
party-specific to reflect potential asymmetries in the cost of pre-trial litigation.
Crucially, one component of the total cost of litigation for the plaintiff is
the cost of filing F , which reflects the plaintiff’s cost of drafting the complaint,
10
as well as the plaintiff’s investment in pre-complaint investigation and informal
discovery. I treat the filing fee to be nominal, and thus the plaintiff can choose
any F ∈ [0, CP ]. The plaintiff has control over whether to devote resources
to factual investigation in the pre-complaint stage of the dispute, rather than
spending those resources (and developing those facts) during litigation. The
plaintiff’s cost of litigation, CP , is thus reduced by the cost of pleading F . Past
models, such as Rosenberg and Shavell (1985), have treated F as an exogenous
constant. A key change in this model is allowing plaintiff to choose F . F in
turn determines the amount of factual and legal detail in the complaint. The
complaint is the mechanism by which F is made observable to the defendant.10
As the very beginning of the game, the defendant has an opportunity to
pay a retainer R ∈ [0, CD] for legal fees. This is a non-refundable pre-payment
for legal services that offsets the defendant’s litigation costs.11
The opportunity to file a complaint comes next. The defendant then files
an answer at cost A ∈ [0, CD − R].12 Spending on A reduces the defendant’s
cost of litigation CD.
There is a single period of litigation, in which the plaintiff has a probability
α, and defendant has a probability (1−α), of making a take-it-or-leave-it offer
of settlement. The discussion so far has assumed α = 0.50 (i.e., each party
has an equal chance to make a settlement offer), which I will continue to do.13
For sake of generality, however, the proofs below allow for arbitrary bargaining
power α ∈ [0, 1].
If the parties do not settle, the plaintiff and defendant spend remaining
litigation costs CP − F and CD − A − R, respectively, and the court enters
judgment with expected value piJ .
The sequential, subgame perfect equilibrium given CP > piJ (i.e., the plain-
10Of course, in real life pleading detail imperfectly communicates pre-suit expenditure
of litigation costs. Nonetheless, it is a valuable proxy, and imformation other than plead-
ing detail—information such as the identity of the plaintiff’s lawyers, for example—also
communicates information about plaintiff’s costs.
11Note that the retainer is bounded above by the defendant’s total litigation costs; sinking
the expected judgment is not possible. Sinking of the expected judgment by paying it to a
third party who is then liable for the judgment is no more than an assignment of the claim,
which simply shifts the commitment problem to the third party. In any event, relaxing this
constraint on R has little effect on the results.
12Fixing F = F¯ and A = A¯ and allowing settlement pre-answer allows one to nest the
model of Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) in this model. As Proposition 1b below makes clear,
allowing or disallowing pre-answer settlement has no effect on the predictions of the model.
13Note that this model is equivalent to an alternating offer, split-the-dollar game with
no outside option. In the limit (i.e., as the number of opportunities to make offers goes
to infinity and as the parties’ shared discount factor goes to 1), the equilibrium division of
surplus in a split-the-dollar game goes to one-half, i.e., α = 0.50. See Rubinstein (1982).
Because this model of a single opportunity for settlement closely approximates a model with
an arbitrary number of periods, this model easily nests Bebchuk’s (1996) model of multiple
periods of litigation and settlement negotiation. See Section 4.4 for further discussion.
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tiff has a NEV claim), is as follows (star superscripts denoting equilibrium
values):14
Proposition 1.
(1a) Settlement. If the plaintiff files suit and has a credible threat to go to
judgment, the parties will immediately settle for S∗(R) = α(piJ + CD −R).
(1b) Answer. A defendant will never file a detailed answer: A∗ = 0.
(1c) Complaint. If a plaintiff files suit, the plaintiff will spend F ∗ = CP −piJ
in preparing the complaint.
Proof. Once the defendant has answered and the plaintiff has a credible
threat to go to judgment, the defendant’s payoff if the case goes to judgment
will be −piJ −CD +A+R. Defendant is willing to incur up to this amount in
settlement costs to avoid going to judgment. With likelihood α, the plaintiff
makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer. In this event, the plaintiff demands
this amount, and the defendant pays. With likelihood (1− α), the defendant
makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer. Given that the plaintiff will have
payoff piJ − CP + F if the case goes to judgment and zero if the plaintiff
drops the case (the cost F is sunk at this point), the defendant will offer
(max{0, piJ − CP + F}) and the parties will settle. (If the defendant offers
less than zero, the plaintiff will simply drop the case, which is equivalent to a
settlement at zero.) The expected settlement is thus S∗ = α(piJ + CD − A−
R) + (1− α) max{0, piJ − CP + F}.
Given that after answering, the defendant will settle for S∗, the defendant’s
payoff will be −S∗−A−R = −α(piJ +CD)− (1−α)(max{0, piJ −CP +F}+
A + R). Defendant maximizes this payoff by choosing A∗ = 0. (Proposition
1b QED.)
After filing suit, plaintiff’s expenditure F is sunk, and going forward plain-
tiff’s payoff from going to judgment is piJ −CP +F and plaintiff’s payoff from
dropping the suit is 0. Thus, plaintiff will only have a credible threat to go to
judgment if piJ − CP + F ≥ 0, which implies F ≥ CP − piJ .
With a credible threat to go to judgment, plaintiff can obtain the settlement
described above, S∗ = α(piJ+CD−A−R)+(1−α) max{0, piJ−CP +F}. The
plaintiff’s net payoff is therefore α(piJ+CD−A−R−F )+(1−α)(piJ−CP ) for
F ≥ CP−piJ . Since the plaintiff’s net payoff is decreasing in F , conditional on
having a credible threat to go to judgment (and filing suit rather than dropping
the claim being optimal), the plaintiff chooses F ∗ = CP −piJ . (Proposition 1c
QED.)
14Note that for simplicity of notation, I assume that a plaintiff indifferent between filing
suit or not will not file suit. I assume that a plaintiff indifferent between continuing a
suit and dropping a suit will continue the suit. I assume that a party indifferent between
settling and not settling will settle. These assumptions dealing with knife-edge conditions
allow me to define equilbrium conditions precisely (with equalities rather than inequalities),
but otherwise do not affect the analysis.
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Given Propositions 1b and 1c, the optimal settlement S∗(R) = α(piJ +
CD −R). (Proposition 1a QED.)
Comment: As shown below, plaintiff will only file suit in equilibrium if R∗ =
0. Thus, if S∗ > 0, S∗ = α(piJ + CD).
Proposition 2: Credibility. The plaintiff will have a credible threat to sue
if the following Credibility Constraint holds:
α(CD −R)− CP + (1 + α)piJ > 0 (1)
If this condition is not met, the plaintiff does not sue or otherwise press the
claim, and the defendant does nothing.
Proof. From Propositions 1a and 1c, plaintiff’s payoff from settlement is
α(CD −R) + (1 + α)piJ −CP . Thus, plaintiff is only willing to sue if suit and
settlement is better than dropping the claim, i.e., α(CD−R)+(1+α)piJ−CP >
0. QED.
Proposition 3: Retainer. The defendant will pay a strictly positive retainer
R∗ =
(
1 + α
α
)
piJ − CP
α
+ CD (2)
if the plaintiff’s credibility condition is met for R = 0 and two conditions are
met. First, the Optimality Constraint must hold:
α(1− α)(piJ + CD) ≤ CP − piJ (3)
Second, the Feasibility Constraint must hold:
(1 + α)piJ ≤ CP (4)
Otherwise, defendant pays no retainer: R∗ = 0.
Proof. The net payoff to defendant if defendant chooses R such that plaintiff
still sues is −α(piJ + CD)− (1− α)R, which is decreasing (more negative) in
R. Thus, unless defendant can deter filing all together, defendant will choose
R∗ = 0.
To deter the plaintiff from filing, defendant must pay a retainer R sufficient
to reduce plaintiff’s expected payoff from suit to zero. From Proposition 2,
this is R such that α(CD−R∗)+(1+α)piJ−CP = 0, which is R∗ =
(
1+α
α
)
piJ−
CP
α
+ CD. This value is strictly positive so long as S
∗(0) − F ∗ > 0, which is
met if and only if the credibility condition obtains.
Defendant will only do this, however, if it yields a better payoff than simply
settling. Thus, to choose R > 0, it must be that R∗ ≤ S∗(0). This implies
α(1−α)(piJ+CD) ≤ CP −piJ . This optimal R∗ > 0 is feasible if R∗ ∈ [0, CD],
which implies (1 + α)piJ ≤ CP . QED.
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Comment. Although the analysis has assumed a NEV claim, applying this
model to PEV claims is straightforward. From the results above (and keeping
in mind the constraint that F cannot be negative), it immediately follows
that for a PEV claim (CP ≤ piJ) the following equilibrium values obtain:
SPEV = piJ + αCD − (1 − α)CP , APEV = 0, F PEV = 0, and RPEV = 0. A
plaintiff with a PEV claim always has a credible threat to sue, and in this
model always files suit, at which time the parties then immediately settle.
Comment. The solution to the basic model reduces to a set of key condi-
tions: the Credibility Condition, Feasibility Condition, and Optimality Condi-
tion. These conditions together define the sets of parameter values for which
nuisance settlements are possible. Figure 2 illustrates how litigation costs and
expected judgment values affect settlement outcomes. Defendant’s litigation
costs CD increase along the x-axis, the expected judgment piJ increases along
the y-axis, and all values are relative to plaintiff’s litigation costs, i.e., CP is
normalized to 1. As before, I set α = 0.5. We see that among NEV claims,
those with both sufficiently low CD and sufficiently low piJ will never be filed;
no cost-sinking strategy can yield plaintiff a positive net payoff. Importantly,
though, cost asymmetry in favor of the plaintiff is not necessary for the plaintiff
to obtain a settlement given a NEV claim–even when defendant has no liti-
gation costs, a plaintiff can induce settlement so long as piJ > 2
3
! Conversely,
claims involving either relatively high expected judgment or high defendant’s
litigation costs will lead to nuisance settlements, notwithstanding the ability of
the defendant to spend on retainers to deter nuisance suits. There is a region,
however, where the expected judgment is relatively low and defendant’s litiga-
tion costs are moderate, in which a retainer strategy can protect the defendant
from nuisance settlements.
4.2 Extension: Strategic Default by the Defendant
One option available to the defendant in real-life litigation that the basic model
does not incorporate is default. The defendant can simply decline to respond to
the plaintiff’s complaint, at which point the court (on motion by the plaintiff)
will enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.15 The option to default is valuable
when litigation costs asymmetrically favor the plaintiff—and thus a settlement,
part of whose value comes from saved litigation costs, may actually exceed the
full value of the plaintiff’s claim! This option to default is most valuable when
the stakes are low but defense costs are high.
To formalize this idea, insert an additional step into the basic game. After
the plaintiffs files a complaint at cost F and before the defendant answers at
cost A, the defendant may choose default, at which point the game ends, and
the parties receive payoffs (J − F,−J −R).
15See Rule 55 and its state analogues.
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Proposition 4: Solution Given Strategic Default. The sequential, sub-
game perfect equilibrium given CP > piJ , is as follows:
(4a) Default. If the plaintiff files suit, defendant will default if
(1− αpi)J < αCD (5)
(For PEV claims, the threshold for default rather than settlement is J <
piJ + αCD − (1− α)CP .)
(4b) Pleading and Settlement. As before, if plaintiff files suit, plaintiff
will spend F ∗ = CP − piJ in preparing the complaint; defendant will not file
a detailed answer: A∗ = 0; and if plaintiff files suit and defendant does not
default, the parties will settle for S∗ = α(piJ + CD).
(4c) Credibility. The plaintiff will have a credible threat to sue if the fol-
lowing Credibility Constraint holds:
(1 + pi)J − CP > 0 if J < α(piJ + CD −R) (6)
α(CD −R)− CP + (1 + α)piJ > 0 otherwise
If this condition is not met, the plaintiff does not sue, and the defendant does
nothing.
(4d) Retainer. The defendant will pay a strictly positive retainer
R∗ =
(
1 + α
α
)
piJ − CP
α
+ CD (7)
if the plaintiff’s credibility condition is met for R = 0 and two conditions are
met. First, the Optimality Constraint must hold:
J ≥ R∗ if J < α(piJ + CD) (8)
α(1− α)(piJ + CD) ≤ CP − piJ otherwise
Second, the Feasibility Constraint must hold:
(1 + α)piJ ≤ CP (9)
Otherwise, defendant pays no retainer: R∗ = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Comment. The availability of default as a strategic option for the defendant
reduces the set of parameter values for which the plaintiff has a credible threat
to sue, and it caps (at J) the amount that defendant must pay to plaintiff
when plaintiff does sue. In this way, strategic default limits the scope and cost
of nuisance suits to defendants. See Figure 3 for an illustration of how the
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equilibrium in the game depends on case strength pi and stakes J .16
Figure 3 reveals an asymmetry between high-merit, low-stakes cases and
low-merit, high-stakes cases.17 In the basic model, high-merit, low-stakes
claims and low-merit, high-stakes claims are equivalent. All claims with com-
binations of pi and J yielding the same product piJ generate an identical set
of payoffs for the parties, because pi and J never appear separately. But the
possibility of default breaks the symmetry.
With default, we see that default is employed in higher-merit, lower-stakes
cases. This has three effects. First, some plaintiffs with higher-merit, lower-
stakes claims who would have had a credible threat to sue in a world without
default, no longer have a credible threat to sue when the defendant has the op-
tion to default. Second, some plaintiffs with higher-merit, lower-stakes claims
who would have obtained a nuisance settlement in a world without default,
now receive a default judgment for a lower payoff. Third, some plaintiffs with
lower-merit claims, who would have been deterred by defendant’s investment
in a retainer in a world without default, now sue and receive a default judg-
ment; in these cases, the option of default is less costly to the defendant than
deterring suit by paying a retainer.
Figure 4 illustrates these three regions for the case where CD = 3CP .
Without default, plaintiffs with merits and stakes in region A have a credible
threat to sue and obtain a settlement; with default, they do not have a credible
threat to sue. Without default, plaintiffs with merits and stakes in region B
have a credible threat to sue and obtain a settlement; with default, they still
have a credible threat to sue, but now receive a smaller payoff from a default
judgment. Without default, plaintiffs with merits and stakes in region C
would be deterred by the defendant’s strategic payment of a retainer; with
default, the defendant does not pay a retainer and the plaintiff obtains a
default judgment.
Proposition 5: Plaintiff Welfare. Take the set of cases such that it is not
optimal for defendant to deter suit by retainer regardless of whether default
is an option. Then, all else equal, plaintiffs with lower-merit cases are weakly
better off than plaintiffs with higher-merit cases.
Proof. See Appendix. The intuition for this proof is straightforward. The
added option of default makes the defendant (at least weakly) better off. Ex-
cept in the case where a default judgment replaces deterrence by retainer, this
means that the plaintiff is (at least weakly) worse off, because the defendant
16Note that while this illustration assumes a slight cost asymmetry in favor of plaintiff
(defendant’s litigation costs are 1.5 times plaintiff’s), the availability of default affects some
outcomes so long as defedant’s litigation costs are higher than one-half plaintiff’s. This
follows from comparing the criteria for default in Proposition 4(a) with plaintiff’s credibility
condition in Proposition 4(c).
17Analytically, this asymmetry follows immediately from Expression (5), defendant’s cri-
teria for default: (1− αpi)J < αCD.
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is paying less to the plaintiff. Because the cost of default is J , this option is
better for the defendant (and thus worse for the plaintiff) when J is low and
pi is high, rather than vice versa.
Comment. This pattern helps explain the strong, anecdotal association be-
tween nuisance litigation and low-merit cases, despite the fact that the Amer-
ican Rule consigns many high-merit claims to NEV status. Not only are
low-merit cases more troublesome from a normative point of view, but all else
equal they are a greater burden on the parties who must pay to resolve NEV
claims.
4.3 Sinking Costs in a Game with Multiple Plaintiffs
The basic model above assumes a game between a single plaintiff and a single
defendant. One might imagine that in reality, a single defendant may face
many potential plaintiffs with nuisance-value suits. If so, then investing in re-
tained legal services may become even more attractive to the defendant. This
depends crucially, however, on the extent to which the plaintiffs act indepen-
dently or can coordinate their actions.
To formalize this idea, take the basic model, but with N ∈ [1,∞) identical
plaintiffs for whom the credibility constraint is met if R = 0. Assume that
each plaintiff must decide independently and sequentially whether to demand
settlement. Define R∗N to be the optimal retainer given N plaintiffs (i.e.,
R∗1 = R
∗).
Proposition 6: Multiple Independent Plaintiffs. So long as the defen-
dant invests R∗N = R
∗, i.e., pays a retainer sufficient to deter one plaintiff, then
defendant deters all plaintiffs. Defendant chooses R∗N = R
∗ if the following
two conditions are met:
Optimality Constraint: α(1−Nα)(piJ + CD) ≤ CP − piJ .
Feasibility constraint: (1 + α)piJ ≤ CP .
Otherwise, defendant chooses R∗N = 0.
Proof. If R∗N deters the first plaintiff, the retained legal services are not
consumed. Thus, when the second plaintiff must decide whether to press his
claim, he is identically situated to the first plaintiff, who was (by construction)
deterred. For this reason, the second plaintiff and all subsequent plaintiffs are
deterred. Thus, so long as the retainer deters the first plaintiff, it deters all
plaintiffs. Further, a retainer larger than necessary to deter one plaintiff is
never optimal, as it increases defendant’s costs without changing the expected
total settlement payments (zero).
From the Proof of Proposition 3, note that a retainer that does not deter a
single plaintiff is never optimal. Thus, the defendant’s choice is between R∗N =
R∗, which deters all plaintiffs, and R∗N = 0, which leads to N settlements,
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each for S∗. Paying R∗ is optimal if R∗ ≤ NS∗. This implies that R∗N = R∗
is optimal if α(1 − Nα)(piJ + CD) ≤ CP − piJ . Given the requirement that
R∗ ∈ [0, CD], the optimal value of R∗N is only feasible if R∗ ≤ CD. This implies
(1 + α)piJ ≤ CP . QED.
Numerical Example. Take the example from Section 3.2 where α = 0.5,
piJ = 0, CP = 100, and CD = 500. As shown there, if the defendant faces a
single potential plaintiff, sinking defendant’s litigation costs will not be opti-
mal. Yet if this defendant faces two plaintiffs who must independently decide,
one at a time, whether to threaten suit, each plaintiff will be deterred by
R∗N = 300. A retainer is optimal; the defendant would rather pay a retainer
of $300 than two $250 settlements.
Now, instead of assuming independent plaintiffs appearing sequentially,
assume that the plaintiffs can coordinate with each other and file suit simul-
taneously.
Proposition 7: Multiple Coordinated Plaintiffs. If it is optimal and
feasible when N = 1 for the defendant to pay retainer R∗, then defendant pays
retainer R∗N = NR
∗ and deters all plaintiffs. Otherwise, defendant chooses
R∗N = 0.
Proof. When plaintiffs can coordinate their actions, they will all simultane-
ously file suit so long as the expected value of suit is greater than zero. Given
this, the retainer must be sufficient to reduce the expected value of suit for
each plaintiff to zero, conditional on all plaintiffs suing. This is achieved only
with R∗N = NR
∗
N . Thus, the optimality and feasibility conditions reduce to
the conditions for N = 1, given in Proposition 3. QED.18
18There is an intermediate case involves multiple plaintiffs who act independently but
move simultaneously, rather than sequentially. In this game, for R > 0, there are three
possible equilbria: no plaintiffs bring claims, all plaintiffs bring claims, or all plaintiffs
employ a mixed strategy. (The latter two are ruled out if the defendant pays retainers
sufficient to deter each plaintiff individually; i.e., given N plaintiffs, the defendant sinks
costs equal to NR∗. This scenario reduces to the case of a single plaintiff.) Define M to
be the largest whole number such that M ≤ R∗NN . Each plaintiff strictly prefers suing if at
least M other plaintiffs sue, and strictly prefers not suing if fewer than M other plaintiffs
sue. One immediately sees that both symmetrical, pure strategy equilibria are possible (i.e.,
for any R∗N ≥ R∗, all plaintiffs sue or no plaintiffs sue). The mixed strategy equilibrium is
degenerate, in that only a zero-measure set of plaintiffs will sue. This is because any mixed
strategy involves some positive probability of suing and the defendant not being able to
deter the plaintiff with a retainer. Since this outcome involves a strictly positive settlement,
and all other outcomes involve a zero payoff, plaintiffs are not indifferent to suing, and
thus will choose a pure strategy. In any event, the basic claim in the text—that plaintiffs
stand to gain dramatically from coordination—holds in this scenario as well, given that one
equilibrium is strictly preferred to the other, and coordination may be required in order for
plaintiffs to act simultaneously at all.
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4.4 Other Extensions
This model accommodates a number of other extensions. Importantly, none of
these extensions change the essence of the model or its empirical predictions.
These extensions include the following:
1. Limited Front Loading of Costs. Although the basic model placed no
limits on the extent to which the plaintiff could (observably) sink liti-
gation costs in advance of litigation, it is more realistic to assume that
some types of litigation costs cannot be sunk in the pre-litigation phase.
If some share of costs cannot be frontloaded, this shrinks the set of pa-
rameters for which a nuisance settlement is feasible but does not change
the central results above. I discuss this further in the Appendix.
2. Costly Front Loading of Costs. The costs of gathering a given set of
facts may be higher in the pre-litigation setting than in the discovery
setting, given that fewer procedural devices are available to the plaintiff
in this situation. This shrinks the set of parameters for which a nuisance
settlement is feasible but does not change the central results above. I
discuss this further in the Appendix.
3. Multiple Periods of Bargaining During Litigation. For simplicity, the
model above presents litigation as occurring in a single period. Following
the approach of Bebchuk (1996), one can extend the model to incorporate
multiple periods of litigation in which the parties have opportunities
for bargaining and in which costs and benefits of future periods are
discounted. For a litigation divided into N periods, over which litigation
costs are spread evenly, the condition for a plaintiff’s claim to be NEV
becomes CP/N > piJ . This expands the set of claims for which a claim
is PEV, but conditional on a claim being NEV, it is straightforward to
show that the optimal cost-sinking strategy of F ∗ = CP − piJ remains
the same. Thus, this expands the set of parameters for which a nuisance
settlement is feasible, but does not change the central results above.
4. Plaintiff’s Attorney Retainers. One might also allow a plaintiff to sink
litigation costs through a retainer. As the analysis above shows, to the
extent that the plaintiff identifies a claim to bring before the defendant
has an opportunity to pay a retainer, the plaintiff will press the claim
(including, potentially, sinking litigation costs through costly pleading)
immediately. Thus, a model in which the plaintiff can pay a retainer
before the defendant can do so is equivalent to a model in which neither
party can pay a retainer (and thus nests within the model as presented
above). Conversely, a model in which the plaintiff can pay a retainer
after the defendant can do so is equivalent to the model as presented;
costly pleading is simply a case-specific retainer.
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5. NEV Defenses with Settlement Value. The analysis so far has examined
the conditions under which a plaintiff with a NEV claim can obtain a
positive settlement. The analysis can also be applied to examine the
conditions under which a defendant with a NEV defense can raise that
defense (which is costly to litigate and may affect the expected judg-
ment). The analysis is the same as above (with the parties reversed),
except that the game for the NEV defense is a subgame within the liti-
gation filed by the plaintiff.
6. Risk Aversion, Unequal Discount Rates, and Non-Monetary Litigation
Costs. As I discuss in the Appendix, the model easily accommodates
risk aversion, unequal discount rates, and non-monetary litigation costs
with no changes to the central results above.
5 Empirical Predictions
The model above is intuitive and analytically tractable, but is it accurate?
In this respect, the model has an advantage over existing models of nuisance
suits and settlements: by incorporating not only litigation costs and expected
judgments, but pleading, default, multiple plaintiffs, retainers, and so on, the
model generates a number of rough, empirical predictions that are either con-
sistent with well-recognized stylized facts or susceptible to testing. I discuss
these predictions below. One must apply predictions from the model to data
with care, however, as this is a symmetric-information model of litigation,
and a comparable asymmetric information model may generate different pre-
dictions. Real-world litigation, of course, involves a mix of cases that can be
characterized as symmetric-information and asymmetric-information disputes.
5.1 Which NEV Claims Lead to Settlement or Default
The model makes a number of sharp predictions about the relationships be-
tween litigation costs, stakes, merits, and litigation outcomes. These are best
illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. Unfortunately, testing all of these relationships
directly requires richer data than generally available in the past. Data on case
merit, in particular, is notoriously elusive.
Prediction: Patterns of alleged nuisance settlement activity should conform
to the relationships between CD and piJ (conditional on CP ) summarized in
Figure 2.
Prediction: Patterns of alleged nuisance settlement activity should conform
to the relationships between pi and J (conditional on CD and CP ) summarized
in Figure 3.
Comment. One category of litigation that probably reflects the use of default
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in a NEV litigation context is litigation by the U.S. government to recover
unpaid student loan debt. Litigating a modest-sized claim to judgment may
cost a plaintiff upwards of tens of thousands of dollars in federal court, a
cost that will usually eclipse most federally-subsidized student loan balances.19
Thus, these claims are NEV for the plaintiff. But these claims are likely to have
relatively high merit and be at least as costly to defendants to litigate. Perhaps
not surprisingly, then, while defaults account for less than 5 percent of federal
civil case dispositions, they account for more than half of all dispositions in
cases to recover unpaid student loans.20
5.2 Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Legal Ser-
vices
Retainers paid by defendants and coordination among plaintiffs play roles in
determining whether NEV claims will have settlement value. To the extent
that NEV claims are a significant part of litigation practice, we should expect
to see these strategies arising in contexts where they are most likely to be
effective.
With respect to retainers, the ubiquity of hourly-fee arrangements rather
than retainer agreements between potential defendants and their law firms
seems to cut against the predictions of the model (at least if nuisance litigation
is as serious problem as sometimes alleged). Yet it is also the case that many
large companies employ significant numbers of litigation attorneys in-house.
These attorneys are paid a salary and thus their pay is, in function if not form,
a retainer.
With respect to coordination, there are certainly many ways in which plain-
tiffs can, in practice, coordinate their efforts. The most obvious, though, is
through retaining common counsel. For this mode to be effective, the law firm
representing the plaintiffs must be large enough to coordinate the claims of
many plaintiffs simultaneously.
Of course, the existence of in-house litigation departments and large plain-
tiffs’ law firms hardly proves the model, although they are consistent with it.21
But the model makes more specific predictions—predictions which have yet to
be specifically studied, but which could be confirmed or falsified.
19According to a recent survey by the Federal Judicial Center (Lee and Willging 2009),
the median per-party cost of litigating a civil case in federal court $44,000.
20To be specific, according to data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts on
all federal civil cases filed 2005–2009, 3.6 percent of all cases ended in default judgments,
but 56.7 percent of student loan default cases did. (Unreported data analysis; available from
author upon request.)
21Also suggestive is the fact that retainers appear more common among defendants than
among plaintiffs. As shown in Section 4.4, paying a retainer is a redundant strategy for
plaintiffs, but not, as shown in Section 4, for defendants.
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Prediction: Coordination by plaintiffs only affects plaintiffs’ outcomes in
cases where, under the conditions of Proposition 5, parameter values are such
that R∗1 = 0 but R
∗
N = R
∗. In other words, coordination improves plaintiffs’
outcomes when the defendant cannot deter a coordinated plaintiff strategy
(i.e., when R∗N = NR
∗
N is not optimal) but can deter plaintiffs acting indepen-
dently. From Propositions 4 and 5, these are cases where CP is very small, or
piJ is not small, relative to CD. Thus, holding defendant’s costs and the mer-
its constant, the model predicts larger plaintiffs’ law firms in contexts where
plaintiffs’ costs are lower—an otherwise counterintuitive result.
Prediction: Retainers by defendants are only effective if the defendant’s op-
timality and feasibility conditions are met. This requires cases with relatively
low piJ but also relatively low CD compared to cases that are filed and settled.
Prediction: Law firms representing plaintiffs will tend to be more specialized
than law firms representing defendants. This is because, in the model, efficient
cost-sinking matters to the drafting of complaints, but not answers. If spe-
cialization generates economies in the preparation of similar pleadings, then
specialization should be more valuable to plaintiffs’ attorneys than defense
attorneys, all else equal.
5.3 Pleading and Settlement
The model makes fairly crisp predictions for pleading behavior and the timing
and value of settlements of NEV claims.
Prediction: In the model, A∗ = 0. Thus, answers will be pleaded in minimal
detail.
Prediction: In the model, if a plaintiff with a NEV claim files suit, the
plaintiff will spend F ∗ = CP − piJ . Thus, some complaints will be pleaded
with great detail (regardless of the pleading standard). Even complaints for
no-merit claims will be pleaded with a degree of detail commensurate with the
plaintiff’s cost of litigating.
Comment. The usual explanation for the fact that plaintiffs have long written
detailed complaints, despite no legal requirement to do so, is that the complaint
is the first opportunity for the plaintiff to “tell his story” and influence the
judge’s attitude toward the case. This is surely true; but if so, then how can
one explain the fact that defendants almost invariable answer with essentially
zero detail? In contrast, this model provides clear intuition for why we might
see such a striking asymmetry in the extent to which the plaintiff and the
defendant “tell their stories” to the judge in the pleadings.22
22Of course, the defendant, unlike the plaintiff has a relatively short amount of time in
which to draft its pleading—usually either 21 or 60 days from service of the complaint in
federal court. See Rule 12(a). Yet this is the same amount of time in which a defendant
may file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (see Rule 12(b)), and motions
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6 Application to Pleading Standards
The primary objective of this paper has been to generate a general model
of NEV litigation in a symmetric-information environment that synthesizes
existing models, examines previously neglected aspects of NEV litigation, and
generates empirical predictions that are either consistent with existing stylized
facts or susceptible to testing based on new data. But this model, precisely
because of its generality, may be useful in answering normative and prescriptive
questions as well. I will present one example here.
This model so far has assumed no pleading standards, instead assessing
what degree of pleading detail would arise endogenously as a matter of liti-
gation strategy. This assumption, that the law requires nothing more than a
nominal amount of factual and legal detail, is consistent with the traditional
account of “notice pleading,” a regime of liberal pleading standards that may
have prevailed in the federal courts from the promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in 1938 until the Supreme Court’s watershed cases Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 [2007]) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S.
662 [2009]). These cases require more than “notice”: a complaint must plead
facts “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” the plaintiff’s legal
claim (544 U.S. at 557), and “only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss” (556 U.S. at 679).23
Plausibility pleading may change the calculus of pleading and settlement in
the model of nuisance suits—indeed, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Twom-
bly suggests that plausibility pleading’s purpose is to change this calculus!
In deploying the plausibility standard to dismiss the claims in Twombly, the
Supreme Court implied its focus was litigation in a full-information environ-
ment. It made little secret that it was motivated by concerns about weak cases
being brought against defendants who know the cases are weak but are vul-
nerable because their costs of defense are so high. The Court fretted over the
possibility that a “plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take
up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value” (550 U.S. at 558 (internal
quotation marks omitted)). The very language of “plausibility” implies an
attempt to weed out cases unlikely to succeed, and with respect to litigation
costs, the Court in Twombly devoted more space in its opinion to documenting
the high cost of defending an antitrust case than it did interpreting the text
to dismiss are often comparable in length and cost to complaints, so detailed answers are
not impracticable. But neither detailed answers nor motions to dismiss are common. As
Hubbard (2014b) notes, motions to dismiss are filed in about 6 percent of cases.
23See also Rule Rule 8(a) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). Once
a plaintiff files a complaint, the defendant can file a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted” under Rule 12(b)(6). The approach in this Section
may also be sensible for studying “fact pleading,” which is required in some state courts, or
other heightened standards, such as those under Rule 9 and the PSLRA.
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of Rule 8 or court precedents on pleading.24
Mapping these concepts from Twombly and Iqbal onto the model of nui-
sance suits is not without difficulty. Making plausibility pleading operational
constitutes a contentious and ongoing project for the federal courts. For my
purposes, I will set aside the many nuances of plausibility pleading doctrine
and assume that it requires some minimum level of costly detail greater than
before: F¯ ∈ (0, CP ). It also requires some minimum level of merit, when previ-
ously none was required: p¯i > 0 but p¯i << 1. (Recall that this model addresses
only the symmetric-information environment, so in this context merit is ob-
servable to the court conditional on spending F¯ preparing the complaint.) For
simplicity, assume further that enforcing these requirements through a motion
to dismiss is costless.
Given this, we obtain two sets of results. The first pair of results address the
extent to which imposing plausibility pleading will change the set of claims for
which the plaintiff will file suit and obtain a settlement. These results indicate
that plausibility pleading has a relatively small deterrent effect on suit and
settlement, even among the set of disputes that involve NEV claims and full
information.
Proposition 8: Effect on suits.
(8a) F¯ . The detailed pleading requirement F¯ will have no effect on which
claims the plaintiff will abandon, the defendant will deter, or the parties will
settle after suit is filed, so long as F¯ ≤ α−α2
1+α−α2CP .
(8b) p¯i. For “frivolous” claims, such that pi = 0, the pleading requirement
p¯i > 0 will have no effect on which claims the plaintiff will file and settle rather
than abandon his claim, so long as CD ≤ CPα(1−α) . When default is an option,
the threshold is CD ≤ 1+αα CP .
Proof. See Appendix.
Comment. Given equal bargaining power (i.e., α = 0.5), pleading standard F¯
has no effect on which claims are filed so long as F¯ ≤ 1
5
CP . In other words, so
long as the plausibility pleading does not require plaintiffs to spend more than
one-fifth of their total litigation costs up front, this requirement of detailed
pleading will have no effect on the rate at which claims are filed or settled!
And while it is uncertain precisely how much detail is required by plausibility
pleading, it seems safe to say that it does not require a plaintiff to spend more
than 20 percent of his litigation costs up front. Though counterintuitive, this
prediction is bolstered by the considerable evidence that the effect of Twombly
and Iqbal has been modest at best. See Hubbard (2014b).
Comment. As shown above in Section 4, even without plausibility pleading,
24The issue of costs in Iqbal is less explicit, but the fact that the petitioners before the
Supreme Court were John Ashcroft, former Attorney General of the United States, and
Robert Mueller III, former Director of the FBI, loomed over the entire decision.
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most of the lowest-merit claims have no settlement value or will be deterred
by retainers. For α = 0.5, p¯i will have no effect on frivolous case filings unless
CD is four times higher than CP . Thus, imposing the pleading requirement p¯i
will affect only two sets of cases: those with very high defendant’s litigation
costs relative to plaintiff’s litigation costs, and those with very high J , such
that piJ is large despite pi being low. In other words, screening on merit will
have no effect on filing except for claims involving extremely asymmetric costs
or extremely high stakes. It is perhaps little surprise, then, that the watershed
plausibility pleading cases, Twombly and Iqbal, both easily fit the mold of cases
with extremely asymmetric litigation costs and gigantic stakes.
The second pair of results address the extent to which plausibility pleading
will affect settlement values.
Proposition 9: Effect on settlement values.
(9a) F¯ . Assume F¯ ≤ α−α2
1+α−α2CP (i.e., no suits are deterred by F¯ ). For claims
where F¯ > CP − piJ , defendants pay higher settlements, and plaintiffs receive
lower net payoffs, than without F¯ .
(9b) p¯i. For “frivolous” claims, such that pi = 0, the pleading requirement
p¯i > 0 will reduce to zero the settlement values of claims for which CD >
CP
α(1−α)
(or, in the extended model with default, CD ≤ 1+αα CP ). For claims with pi ≥ p¯i,
it will have no effect.
Proof. Given F¯ > CP − piJ and the Proof of Proposition 1, the equilibrium
settlement is SF¯ = piJ + αCD − (1 − α)(CP − F¯ ) > S∗. Plaintiff’s payoff is
SF¯−F¯ = piJ+α(CD−F¯ )−(1−α)CP < S∗−CP +piJ = (1+α)piJ+αCD−CP .
Proposition 9(b) follows immediately from Proposition 8(b). QED.
Comment. Counterintuitively, plausibility pleading has an effect on strong
claims. In the nuisance suit model, strong claim are pleaded in less detail,
because the threat to sue is credible even without fewer costs sunk. Plausibility
pleading forces plaintiffs with high-expected-value claims to sink more costs in
detailed pleading in order to induce settlement. This reduces the surplus from
settlement and—because the parties split the surplus when settling—reduces
the net payoffs of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Comment. If enforcing the pleading standard is costly, even meritless claims
may still have nuisance value, if the cost to the defendant of filing a motion to
dismiss is sufficiently high that a post-filing and pre-motion-to-dismiss settle-
ment will yield the plaintiff a positive net payoff. (This is an example of the
original Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) model.) But so long as filing a motion
to dismiss is not too costly, plausibility pleading will deter those claims of the
lowest merit that otherwise would be filed.
Although most of the commentary on plausibility has focused on the po-
tentially harmful effect of plausibility pleading on claims involving asymmetric
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information,25 there are reasons to doubt that plausibility pleading standards
are unlikely to have a large effect on such litigation (Hubbard 2014b; Kaplow
2013, 1269–70). Yet the model above suggests, somewhat ironically, that unin-
tended and undesirable consequences of a higher pleading standard may arise
in the context of symmetric-information litigation.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a model that explains the (widely reported, although hard
to confirm empirically) phenomenon of nuisance suits and settlements. It syn-
thesizes insights of existing symmetric-information models of NEV litigation
while maintaining analytical tractability. It shows how observed patterns of
pleading practice can arise endogenously from litigation strategy, even in the
absence of pleading standards. And it predicts previously unconsidered effects
of plausibility pleadings standards: in the full information context, plausi-
bilty pleading may have a relatively small effect in terms of discouraging weak
claims, but may worsen the outcomes for both plaintiffs and defendants in
cases involving strong claims.
Nonetheless, one must exercise care in applying this model to questions of
policy, as only a few of the testable empirical predictions of the model have yet
been explored. The rich set of empirical predictions provided by this model
may open up opportunities for empirical research on nuisance litigation; in
the past, the unobservability of true case merit, coupled with few testable
predictions in existing models, provided little fodder for empirical work on
nuisance litigation.
Further, real-life litigation comprises a mix of symmetric-information and
asymmetric-information disputes. A more complete analysis of NEV litigation
would examine asymmetric-information disputes as well, a topic that a large
literature has already begun to plumb.
A Appendix: Additional Extensions
As discussed in Section 4.4, a number of extensions can enrich the model,
although none fundamentally change the results presented in the main body
of the paper. I discuss several of them further here.
Limited Front Loading of Costs. Although the basic model places no limits
25For example, Reinert (2010) notes the historical importance of federal courts to civil
rights claimants, as well as the particular difficulty that individuals with claims such as em-
ployment discrimination will have pleading specific facts about the defendant’s motives. The
concern here is one of asymmetric information: only the defendant knows the defendant’s
motives.
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on the extent to which the plaintiff could (observably) sink litigation costs in
advance of litigation, it is more realistic to assume that some types of litigation
costs cannot be sunk in the pre-litigation phase. Preparing for many aspects
of trial; deposing the defendant, defendant’s employees, or other potential
witnesses known only to the defendant; and reviewing documents produced
by the defendant in discovery are some of the costs of litigation that cannot
be sunk in advance by the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, major categories of litigation cost can be sunk. Interviewing
the plaintiff; identifying and interviewing any cooperative potential witnesses
and preparing them to be deposed; preserving, collecting, and reviewing doc-
uments for production in discovery; drating discovery requests; legal research
and the drafting of legal arguments to address substantive and procedural is-
sues in the case; and developing the plaintiff’s affirmative case can all be done
in advance of litigation and, to varying degrees, documented in the complaint.
Crucially, all or most of the costs that cannot be sunk are costs that the plain-
tiff need not (and often cannot) incur until after the defendant has expended
its costs that correspond to plaintiff’s costs that can be sunk. For example, the
plaintiff cannot review the defendant’s document production until the defen-
dant has preserved, collected, reviewed, and produced documents; the plaintiff
cannot depose defendant’s employees until the defendant has identified them
and prepared them for depositions; and plaintiff need not prepare for trial
until after the defendant has expended costs on all pre-trial litigation steps.
Thus, in essential respects the basic model’s logic continues to hold: by
sinking the costs that can be sunk, the plaintiff generates a credible threat
to proceed to a stage of litigation that will require the defendant to expend
a large share of its litigation costs. (While I do not present it here, it is
straightforward to extend the formal model to divide litigation costs between
those that can and cannot be sunk pre-litigation.) If some share of costs
cannot be frontloaded, this shrinks the set of parameters for which a nuisance
settlement is feasible, but does not change the central results above.
Costly Front Loading of Costs. There is also the fact that the costs of
gathering a given set of facts may be much higher in the pre-litigation setting
than in the discovery setting, given that fewer procedural devices are available
to the plaintiff in this situation. Note, however, that for frivolous claims there
is, by construction, no new information and no merit to discover.
In this regard, one may wonder how a plaintiff with a meritless claim
can expend costs on detailed pleading. It is worth noting that the model
in Section 4 does not require that the details of the complaint, if true, tend
to prove plaintiff’s case. Instead, the model only requires that the details
in the complaint reflect the expenditure of effort that otherwise would have
to occur after the complaint was filed. In this respect, documenting a failed
investigation works as well as documenting a successful one! If this sounds
far-fetched, it may be. But consider the possibility that, at least to the eyes of
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seven Supreme Court justices, this is exactly what the complaint in Twombly
did.26
Of course, for claims that are brought because of their merit (including
some NEV claims), plaintiffs may need to conduct more development of the
facts and evidence (even in a symmetric-information environment) to take
the case to judgment, and these efforts could be more expensive in the pre-
litigation stage.27 Also, to the extent that the parties discount future payoffs,
front loaded litigation costs are undiscounted, unlike costs incurred during
litigation. Thus, discounting of future payoffs will reduce the benefits of front
loading.
It is straightforward to extend the formal model to allow for litigation
activity to be more costly pre-filing than post-filing, such that an expenditure
F in preparing the complaint reduces CP by only βF , where β ∈ [0, 1]. This
shrinks the set of parameters for which a nuisance settlement is feasible, but
does not change the central results above.
Risk Aversion, Unequal Discount Rates, and Non-Monetary Costs. The
model can accommodate risk aversion and non-monetary litigation costs with
no changes to the substance of the model. The value of non-monetary litigation
costs, such as reputational harms or bad publicity during litigation or anxiety
over appearing in court, can be incorporated into CP and CD. Conversely,
benefits from the process of litigation itself, such as the utility a plaintiff
receives from having his day in court, can be incorporated as negative costs.
Risk aversion is simply a species of litigation cost, given that litigation is
risky and settlement eliminates the risk. Formally, the difference between the
expected judgment and the certainty equivalent of a future judgment for each
party can be incorporated into each party’s litigation costs and thus is part of
the surplus from settlement. To the extent that the parties differ in their risk
aversion, this is equivalent to a difference in their litigation costs.
As noted above, incorporating discounting of future payoffs affects the
set of claims for which a strategy of front loading litigation costs is optimal.
Discount rates may also affect outcomes insofar as they are unequal between
the parties. In this respect, though, the difference in the parties’ discount rates
can be easily (if somewhat roughly) conceptualized as a determinant of α, the
measure of bargaining power. Whichever party discounts the future more will
capture a smaller share of the surplus from settlement.
26See Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
No. 02 CIV 10220 (S.D.N.Y. filed April 14, 2003) (This complaint was 29 pages long, with
94 of 96 numbered paragraphs “based upon . . . the investigation of counsel.”)
27In the asymmetric information setting, of course, it is natural to assume that develop-
ment of certain facts in litigation may be less expensive than development of those facts
pre-litigation.
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B Appendix: Additional Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4
From Proposition 1, we have F ∗ = CP−piJ , A∗ = 0, and S∗(R) = α(piJ+CD−
R). Note that A∗ and S∗(R) are unaffected by the addition of default, because
they occur later in the game, and the game is solved by backwards induction.
Further, F ∗ is unaffected. Were plaintiff to file suit with any F < F ∗, the
defendant answers at cost A∗ = 0 and then plaintiff drops the suit at payoff
−F , which is (weakly) worse than doing nothing at all; the option for default
thus does not affect F ∗. And as shown below, plaintiff files suit in equilibrium
only if R∗ = 0. Proposition 4(b) QED.
Conditional on plaintiff filing suit, defendant’s payoff from default is −J −
R, while its payoff from settling is −S∗(R)−R. Thus, defendant prefers default
when J < S∗(R). As shown below, plaintiff files suit in equilibrium only if
R∗ = 0. Thus, defendant will default when J < α(piJ + CD). Rearranging
yields (1− αpi)J < αCD. Proposition 4(a) QED.
In this extension, the Credibility Constraint depends on whether the de-
fendant will default or settle. Defendant’s payoff from default is −J − R,
while its payoff from settling is −S∗(R)−R. Thus, defendant chooses default
if J < S∗(R) = α(piJ + CD − R). If this condition is met, then defendant
will default, and plaintiff’s payoff will be J − F ∗ = J − CP + piJ . Otherwise,
plaintiff’s payoff will be α(CD − R) + (1 + α)piJ − CP . Plaintiff’s claim is
credible so long as his payoff exceeds zero. Proposition 4(c) QED.
Next, the defendant’s choice of retainer will be, as in Proposition 3 above,
either R∗ = 0 or R∗ =
(
1+α
α
)
piJ − CP
α
+ CD. The net payoff to defendant if
defendant chooses R such that plaintiff still sues is either −J −R or −α(piJ +
CD) − (1 − α)R, both of which are decreasing (more negative) in R. Thus,
unless defendant can deter filing all together, defendant will choose R∗ = 0.
Now note that plaintiff’s Credibility Condition when defendant will default
does not depend on R. Thus, the choice of retainer cannot deter plaintiff if
defendant will default in equilibrium. Next, note that S∗(R) is decreasing in
R. Thus, the choice of R > 0 can never make default preferable to settlement
when settlement is preferable to default for R = 0. Thus, retainer can operate
in only two ways: First, when plaintiff would file and defendant would settle
if R = 0, and R > 0 reduces the value of settlement to the point that plaintiff
will not file suit. Second, when plaintiff would file and defendant would default
if R = 0, but R > 0 reduces the value of settlement to the point that defendant
will choose to settle rather than default, and plaintiff will consequently not file
suit.
In both these scenarios, the retainer must be sufficient to reduce plain-
tiff’s payoff from filing and settlement to zero; this retainer amount is given
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by Proposition 3. Likewise, the Feasibility Constraint from Proposition 3 is
unaffected.
Turning to the Optimality Constraint, for J ≥ α(piJ + CD), default is
irrelevant and the Credibility Constraint from Proposition 2 holds. If, however,
J < α(piJ + CD), then the payoff from R
∗ = 0 is −J . With R∗ > 0, plaintiff
is deterred from filing, so the payoff is −R∗. In this case, it is optimal for
defendant to pay a positive retainer when J ≥ R∗ or:
J ≥
(
1 + α
α
)
piJ − CP
α
+ CD (10)
Proposition 4(d) QED.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Without loss of generality two plaintiffs, indexed 1 and 2, such that pi1 > pi2,
pi1J1 = pi2J2, and
piJ >
CP − α(1− α)CD
1 + α− α2 (11)
Note that this implies that J1 < J2, that Plaintiff 1 is the higher-merit plaintiff,
and that it is never optimal for the defendant to pay a retainer. There are five
cases to consider.
Case 1: Both plaintiffs obtain default judgments. In this case, the payoff to
plaintiff i is Ji−CP +piiJi. Because J2 > J1 and pi1J1 = pi2J2, the lower-merit
plaintiff is strictly better off.
Case 2: Both plaintiffs obtain settlements. In this case, the payoff to
plaintiff i is αCD + (1 + α)piiJi − CP . Because pi1J1 = pi2J2, the two plaintiffs
receive equal payoffs.
Case 3: Plaintiff 1 obtains a default judgment and Plaintiff 2 obtains a
settlement. In this case, the payoff to Plaintiff 1 is V1 = J1 − CP + pi1J1. The
payoff to Plaintiff 2 is V2 = αCD+(1+α)pi2J2−CP . Because pi1J1 = pi2J2, the
difference in payoffs is V2−V1 = α(CD+pi1J1)−J1. Because Plaintiff 1 obtains
a default judgment, we know from Proposition 4a that J1 < α(CD + pi1J1).
Thus, V2 − V1 > 0; the lower-merit plaintiff is strictly better off. Note that
the converse of Case 3 never occurs—it cannot be the case that the lower-
merit plaintiff obtains a default judgment if the higher-merit plaintiff obtains
a settlement. This follows from Proposition 4(a).
Case 4: Plaintiff 1 has no credible threat to sue and Plaintiff 2 has a credible
threat to sue. It follows immediately that that the lower-merit plaintiff is
strictly better off. Note that the converse of Case 4 never occurs—it cannot
be the case that the lower-merit plaintiff has no credible threat if the higher-
merit plaintiff has a credible threat. This follows from Propositions 2 and
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4(b).
Case 5: Neither plaintiff has a credible threat to sue. It immediately follows
that the two plaintiffs receive equal payoffs. QED.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 8
For parameter values such that F¯ ≤ CP−piJ , F¯ is not binding and thus has no
effect. For parameter values such that F¯ > CP − piJ , first solve the model (as
shown in Section 4) with the additional constraint that F ∗ = max{F¯ , CP−piJ}.
This yields the following constraints:
Credibility Constraint: piJ + α(CD −R)− (1− α)CP − αF¯ > 0.
Feasibility Constraint: piJ − (1− α)CP − αF¯ ≤ 0
Optimality Constraint: α(1−α)CD+(2α−α2)(CP − F¯ )−αpiJ ≤ CP −piJ .
For F¯ to change plaintiff’s decision to file suit or the defendant’s decision to
pay a retainer, it must be the case that either the claim satisfies the credibility
constraint without F¯ but cannot meet the constraint with F¯ , or a retainer
payment is not made without F¯ , but is both feasible and optimal with F¯ .
First, consider the credibility constraint. The plaintiff satisfies it without
F¯ if (1 +α)piJ +αCD −CP > 0, and the plaintiff fails the condition with F¯ if
piJ + αCD − (1− α)CP − αF¯ ≤ 0 and F¯ > CP − piJ . Define F¯Cred to be the
largest value of F¯ for which F¯ does not affect credibility for any value of CD
or piJ .28 This value is solved by:29
F¯Cred = min
{piJ,CD}
max{piJ − (1− α)CP
α
+ CD, CP − piJ} (12)
This yields F¯Cred = α
1+α
CP . Note that the solution to F¯
Cred involves setting
CD = 0.
Second, consider the feasibility constraint. Define F¯ Feas to be the largest
value of F¯ for which F¯ does not affect feasibility for any value of CD or piJ .
Given that the solution to F¯Cred implies CD = 0, the solution for feasibility
reduces to the solution for credibility: F¯ Feas = F¯Cred.
Third, consider the optimality constraint. The plaintiff satisfies it without
F¯ if α(1−α)(piJ+CD) > CP −piJ , and the plaintiff fails the condition with F¯
if α(1−α)CD+(2α−α2)(CP − F¯ )−αpiJ ≤ CP −piJ and F¯ > CP −piJ . Define
F¯Opti to be the largest value of F¯ for which F¯ does not affect optimality for
28Note that by allowing F¯ , CD, and piJ to vary, I treat CP as the numeraire value; I
express the minimum cost of pleading detail F¯ in units of CP .
29Technically, the inequalities above define an open set comprising all values of F¯ such
that F¯ > CP − piJ affects credibility. The infimum of this set is thus the largest value of F¯
such that F¯ does not affect credibility. This is the value for which Equation (12) solves.
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any value of CD or piJ . This value is solved by:
F¯Opti = min
{piJ,CD}
max{1− α
2− αCD−
1− 2α + α2
2α− α2 CP +
1− α
2α− α2piJ,CP −piJ} (13)
This yields F¯Opti = α−α
2
1+α−α2CP < F¯
Cred. Thus, the largest value of F¯ for which
it has no effect on which claims settle is F¯Opti = α−α
2
1+α−α2CP . Proposition 8(a)
QED.
For pi = 0, even without p¯i > 0, the plaintiff will not bring the claim if
either the credibility constraint is not met, or if the optimality and feasibility
constraints are met. In the basic model, from Propositions 2 and 3, it follows
that for pi = 0, there will be no suit and settlement so long as CD ≤ CPα(1−α) . In
the extended model with default, from Proposition 4, if follows that for pi = 0,
there will be no suit and settlement so long as CD ≤ 1+αα CP . 30 Proposition
8(b) QED.
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